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WISHING TO BE PART OF THAT COURT:
HOW THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN
BP P.L.C. V. MAYOR OF BALTIMORE LETS ENERGY
COMPANIES WANDER FREE AND DROWN THE
SHORE UP ABOVE
I. WHAT’S

THE

WORD? AN INTRODUCTION
LITIGATION FIRE

TO A

BURNING

Climate change litigation has substantially increased both domestically and internationally in recent years.1 In the United
States, many state and local governments are initiating lawsuits
based on state law theories in an attempt to hold energy companies
accountable for their contributions to climate change.2 These companies are delaying litigation in response, which comes at a hefty
price to all involved.3
A longstanding question exists regarding whether federal or
state court is the proper venue for climate change litigation.4 Arguments on either side generally proceed as follows: proponents of
cases being in federal court believe climate change is an inherently
federal issue, whereas those favoring review in state court argue
state court is the more appropriate venue to recover monetary dam1. See United Nations, Climate Litigation Spikes, Giving Courts an ‘Essential Role’
in Addressing Climate Crisis, UN NEWS (Jan. 26, 2021), https://news.un.org/en/
story/2021/01/1083032 (citing report finding climate change cases have increased in frequency in past three years and have become more successful); see also
Giuliana Viglione, Climate Lawsuits are Breaking New Legal Ground to Protect the Planet,
NATURE (Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00175-5
(noting environmentalists are optimistic about increased litigation’s potential impact on future climate change relief).
2. Dino Grandoni, States and Cities Scramble to Sue Oil Companies Over Climate
Change, WASH. POST (Sept. 14, 2020, 5:31 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
climate-environment/2020/09/14/states-cities-scramble-sue-oil-companies-overclimate-change/ (explaining states, cities, and local governments are suing energy
companies for contributing to climate change).
3. See Emma F. Blake, Kicking the Climate Can Down the Road: BP v. Baltimore
and Chevron v. Oakland, HAUSFELD FOR THE CHALLENGE (July 20, 2021), https://
www.hausfeld.com/what-we-think/perspectives-blogs/kicking-the-climate-candown-the-road-bp-v-baltimore-and-chevron-v-oakland/ (exploring procedural delay
in litigating climate change cases and discussing climate change’s high cost).
4. See Mike Theroux, Laura Gill & Jon McKay, Win for American Energy Companies Facing Climate Change Litigation, BENNETT JONES (June 1, 2021), https://
www.bennettjones.com/Blogs-Section/Win-for-American-Energy-Companies-Facing-Climate-Change-Litigation (examining venue question in light of BP P.L.C. v.
Mayor of Baltimore).
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ages.5 Due to the obscure nature of this jurisdictional question, environmentalists and energy companies have long awaited the day
when the United States Supreme Court would provide clearer
guidance.6
In October 2020, the Supreme Court decided to hear a seemingly promising case in BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore.7 The Court,
however, only offered guidance on 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), which provides when a remand order is reviewable, and declined to rule on
the case’s broader environmental issues.8 Although this decision
adds to the existing body of Supreme Court environmental jurisprudence, the Court has yet to issue a clear answer on whether climate change litigation belongs in federal or state court.9
This Note explores the intersection of civil procedure and environmental law, concluding the Supreme Court’s holding benefits
energy companies by allowing them to prolong litigation and burdens both appellate courts and local governments.10 Part II provides the facts of BP P.L.C.11 Part III summarizes the case’s relevant
legal precedent and supplies a background on the § 1447(d),

5. See David Hasemyer, The Supreme Court Hears Arguments on Climate Change. Is
It Ready to Decide Which Courts Have Jurisdiction?, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Jan. 20,
2021), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/20012021/supreme-court-climatechange-jurisdiction/ (summarizing why certain parties prefer federal or state court
for climate change litigation). See generally Challenges to Environmental Protection in
the Courts Continued, ENV’T L. INST., https://www.eli.org/program-constitutioncourts-legislation/challenges-environmental-protection-courts-continued (last visited Mar. 14, 2022) (explaining arguments relating to federal preemption of state
law).
6. See Grandoni, supra note 2 (detailing trajectory of climate change lawsuits,
particularly in federal court system).
7. 141 S. Ct. 1532, 1543 (2021) (holding § 1447(d) permits appellate courts
to review all parts of district court’s remand order).
8. Id. at 1536 (stating claim’s merits were irrelevant to appeal).
9. See id. at 1543 (articulating Court’s holding); see also David Hasemyer, The
Supreme Court Sidesteps a Full Climate Change Ruling, Handing Industry a Procedural
Win, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (May 18, 2021), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/
18052021/the-supreme-court-sidesteps-a-full-climate-change-ruling-handing-industry-a-procedural-win/ (noting Court’s reluctance to decide more significant climate change venue issue); Lesley Clark, Judges to Hit Key Climate Question: State of
Federal Court?, E&E NEWS: CLIMATEWIRE (Nov. 30, 2021, 6:17 AM), https://
www.eenews.net/articles/judges-to-hit-key-climate-question-state-or-federal-court/
(exploring recent cases discussing whether climate change litigation belongs in
state or federal court).
10. For a discussion of BP P.L.C.’s potential impact on energy companies, appellate courts, and local governments, see infra notes 194-224 and accompanying
text.
11. For a discussion of BP P.L.C.’s facts and procedural history, see infra notes
16-43 and accompanying text.
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§ 1442, and general environmental venue issues.12 Part IV analyzes
the Supreme Court’s decision and reasoning in BP P.L.C.13 Part V
contends the majority’s opinion perpetuates inequitable litigation
that runs contrary to the reason Congress amended § 1447(d).14
Finally, Part VI discusses the case’s impact on energy companies,
the broader electorate, appellate courts, Congress, and — ultimately — the future of federal and state climate law.15
II. BETCHA

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT UNDERSTANDS
REMAND: THE FACTS OF BP P.L.C.

AND

THEY

Since approximately 2017, various states, cities, and counties
across the United States have sued energy companies for climate
change-related damages.16 These complaints generally allege the
companies’ activities directly contribute to climate change and
cause deteriorating conditions which the cities are responsible for
repairing.17 To cover these costs, local governments have sought
monetary damages in court.18
12. For a discussion of the relevant civil procedure and environmental background, see infra notes 44-116 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s holding and reasoning in BP
P.L.C., see infra notes 117-70 and accompanying text.
14. For a critical analysis of the Court’s decision in BP P.L.C. and a discussion
of its potential consequences, see infra notes 171-93 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of BP P.L.C.’s impact, see infra notes 194-224 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Mayor of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., 388 F. Supp. 3d 538, 548 (D. Md.
2019) (articulating Baltimore alleged energy companies contributed substantially
to climate change); Cnty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934, 939
(N.D. Cal. 2018) (discussing climate change lawsuit against various energy companies based on state law theories); City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d
466, 469-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (noting claims against similar energy companies to
recover monetary damages related to climate change destruction), aff’d sub nom.
City of New York v. Chevron Corp., 993 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2021); Rhode Island v.
Chevron Corp., 393 F. Supp. 3d 142, 146 (D.R.I. 2019) (providing Rhode Island
sued energy companies for climate change-related damages in state court).
17. See, e.g., BP P.L.C., 388 F. Supp. 3d at 548 (stating Baltimore sued various
energy companies in state court to recover costs related to climate change); Cnty.
of San Mateo, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 937 (explaining local governments sought monetary damages for injuries localities sustained); City of New York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at
470-72 (noting city brought claims against energy companies to recover damages
for companies’ greenhouse gas emissions); Rhode Island, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 146-47
(indicating states and localities are alleging companies contributed to climate
change and are seeking damages based on state tort theories).
18. See David Hasemyer, Five States Have Filed Climate Change Lawsuits, Seeking
Damages from Big Oil and Gas, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Sept. 15, 2020), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/15092020/climate-change-lawsuit-connecticutdeleware/ (observing various states and localities are suing energy companies to
recover costs related to climate change).
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The City of Baltimore was one of the parties that participated
in these lawsuits, suing multiple energy companies in the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City, a Maryland state court.19 Baltimore alleged the energy companies concealed information about their
products’ negative environmental impacts to the public’s detriment.20 Further, Baltimore claimed the energy companies contributed to extreme weather events and argued the energy companies
— rather than taxpayers — should pay for the damages.21 Baltimore accordingly brought forth eight state-based causes of action,
including public and private nuisance, failure to warn, strict liability
and negligent design defect, and trespass claims.22 Baltimore also
alleged the energy companies violated the Maryland Consumer
Protection Act by engaging in misleading trade practices when the
companies published product information contrary to scientific
data.23
As mentioned, Baltimore initially sued the various energy companies in Maryland state court.24 Generally, if a plaintiff files a lawsuit in state court, a defendant has the opportunity under federal
law to “remove” the case by arguing it actually belongs in federal
19. Complaint ¶¶ 20-31, Mayor of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., 388 F. Supp. 3d 538
(D. Md. 2018) (No. 18-2357) (outlining lawsuit against twenty-six energy companies for their role in climate change). Baltimore alleged it was not trying to prevent the energy companies from continuing their day-to-day operations. Id. ¶ 12
(limiting litigation goal to recovering monetary damages from companies rather
than completely prohibiting companies’ conduct).
20. Id. ¶¶ 141-70 (alleging defendant energy companies knew about environmental harm but failed to publicly disclose information to public). Baltimore alleged the defendants should have warned the public and that their failure to do so
was “deceptive.” Id. ¶ 170 (arguing defendants should have taken precautions to
limit contributions to climate change).
21. Id. ¶ 12 (detailing specific ways in which energy companies destroyed
physical environment). Baltimore explicitly stated the energy companies were responsible for increasing sea levels and temperatures, unusual weather events, and
other environmental harm that “local taxpayers” should not bear the financial burden of repairing. Id. (arguing energy companies should pay for damages).
22. Id. ¶ 11 (listing eight causes of action). Baltimore brought all causes of
action against every defendant. Id. (asserting eight causes of action against each
defendant).
23. Id. ¶¶ 11, 292-98 (alleging energy companies misled consumers through
unscrupulous marketing tactics). Baltimore alleged that the energy companies
profited by “misleading” customers. Id. ¶¶ 295-98 (reasoning practices also
harmed city).
24. Complaint, supra note 19 ¶¶ 33-35 (explaining how Circuit Court for Baltimore City had jurisdiction and was proper venue for case). Baltimore stated this
local court was appropriate because the claims “arose” in Baltimore, one of the
defendants conducted business in Baltimore, and the court had the requisite personal jurisdiction over all defendant energy companies. Id. (outlining jurisdictional and venue bases for state court to hear case).
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court.25 Defendants often invoke removal in hopes that a better
outcome will result in federal court.26 The general removal statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1441, allows defendants to remove civil cases from state
to federal court if the federal court has jurisdiction to hear them.27
In response to Baltimore’s complaint, the energy companies
attempted to remove the case to federal court by invoking the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442, as one of multiple
bases for removal.28 This statute allows individuals or corporations
working on behalf of the federal government to remove a case to
federal court.29 Baltimore then challenged the energy companies’
removal request, arguing the case belonged in state court.30 The
United States District Court for the District of Maryland agreed with
Baltimore and remanded the case to the original Maryland state
court.31 The energy companies then requested the Fourth Circuit
reverse the district court’s judgment.32 Although appellate courts
like the Fourth Circuit generally do not have the authority to review
a district court’s order remanding a case back to state court, they do
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (providing option for defendants to move case from
state court to federal court).
26. See Lonny Hoffman & Erin Horan Mendez, Wrongful Removals, 71 FLA. L.
REV. F. 220, 225 (2020) (explaining defendants often invoke 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442(a)(1), another removal statute). Congress enacted the federal officer removal statute in 1815 primarily to eliminate risk of local prejudice, believing federal courts could better handle conflicting state law. Id. at 225-26 (discussing
statute’s history and purpose).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (providing option for defendants to move case to federal court from state court). Section 1446 provides the general procedure for removal actions. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (articulating requirements and steps defendants
must take to remove case pursuant to Rule 11 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
28. Notice of Removal by Defendants Chevron Corp. and Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc., Mayor of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., No. 1:18-CV-02357, 2018 WL 1007518, at *14 (D. Md. July 20, 2018) (arguing removal to federal court was proper under various federal civil procedure statutes). The energy companies argued Baltimore was
suing them for activities within the federal government’s purview involving issues
related to national security and energy policy; accordingly, the energy companies
further argued removal to the federal court under the federal officer statute was
appropriate. Id. at *2 (moving to dismiss plaintiff’s claims under Rule 12 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on basis that defendant energy companies had contracted with federal government for fuel and other sales related to military use).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (allowing certain parties to remove action from state
to federal court); FED. R. CIV. P. 81(c), Note to Subdivision (c) (listing relevant
removal statutes and permitting federal officers to remove cases to federal court).
30. Mayor of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., 388 F. Supp. 3d 538, 549 (D. Md. 2019)
(explaining procedural background of case after companies attempted to remove
case to federal court).
31. Id. (holding all bases defendants asserted for removal were inadequate
and remanding case to local court).
32. Appellant’s Opening Brief, Mayor of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., No. 19-1644,
2019 WL 3491806, at *3 (4th Cir. Mar. 6, 2019) (arguing federal courts should
resolve global warming claims).
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have that power when a district court partly bases a remand order
on either 28 U.S.C. § 1442 or § 1443, the latter of which provides
federal jurisdiction for civil rights cases.33
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit interpreted the pertinent removal statute, § 1447(d), as authorizing appellate courts to review a
remand order narrowly; this meant the court would only review the
parts of the remand order pertaining to § 1442 or § 1443.34 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit’s narrow interpretation meant the
court lacked jurisdiction to review the parts of the district court’s
remand order that did not deal with either § 1442 or § 1443.35
Thus, the Fourth Circuit only analyzed whether § 1442 warranted
removal to federal court.36 The Fourth Circuit ultimately held the
energy companies did not qualify as federal officers because their
contracts with the federal government were merely “incidental” and
the activities Baltimore alleged in its initial complaint were not “sufficiently related” to the energy companies’ work as federal
contractors.37
The energy companies then appealed the Fourth Circuit’s decision, petitioning the Supreme Court to review the case.38 The
energy companies made three arguments in favor of Supreme
Court review.39 Their first argument was that the Fourth Circuit’s
decision involved a circuit split as to the correct interpretation of
33. BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 952 F.3d 452, 458 (4th Cir. 2020) (recounting defendants’ request that Fourth Circuit review district court’s remand
order), cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 1532 (2021). Appellate courts only have jurisdiction
to review remand orders in specific circumstances under § 1447(d), though it was
unclear what exactly those circumstances were before this case. Id. at 459-61 (explaining § 1447(d)’s authority granting appellate review in certain situations).
34. Id. at 460-61 (holding in favor of narrow review limited to § 1442 or
§ 1443 parts of remand order).
35. Id. at 461 (ruling no jurisdiction existed for appellate court to review entire remand order).
36. Id. at 461-71 (scrutinizing defendants’ federal officer argument but deciding not to impose sanctions).
37. Id. (determining companies did not meet “acted under” or “causal-nexus”
prongs of federal officer test). For a private corporate defendant to qualify as a
federal officer, it must show three things: (1) the company “act[ed] under” a federal officer,” (2) the company “has a colorable federal defense,” and (3) “the
charged conduct was carried out for [or] in relation to the asserted official authority.” Id. at 461-62 (citing Sawyer v. Foster Wheeler LLC, 860 F.3d 249, 254 (4th Cir.
2017)) (holding district court applied incorrect standard and manufacturer met
proper requirements).
38. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore, No. 191189, 2020 WL 1557798, at *4 (4th Cir. Mar. 2020) (appealing Fourth Circuit’s
decision and petitioning for Supreme Court to grant writ of certiorari).
39. Id. at *11-23 (arguing Supreme Court review was appropriate to resolve
circuit split, Fourth Circuit’s decision was incorrect, and frequency of issue demanded further review).
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§ 1447(d) and, therefore, Supreme Court review was essential to
provide guidance to lower courts.40 Second, the energy companies
argued the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of § 1447(d) was incorrect because it was inconsistent with the statute’s purpose and Supreme Court precedent.41 Lastly, the energy companies argued a
Supreme Court ruling on this issue was necessary to reconcile frequent contradictory holdings.42 Though the Supreme Court had
been relatively hesitant to reenter a climate change debate, it did so
in 2020 in BP P.L.C.43
III. UNPACKING A TREASURE TROVE UNTOLD: A BACKGROUND
THE ROLE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN BP P.L.C. AND CLIMATE
CHANGE LITIGATION

ON

Government entities regularly pursue litigation against energy
companies due to their negative impacts on the physical environment.44 In response, energy companies often invoke procedural arguments in their attempts to have more favorable law control the
case or to delay litigation.45 An overview of the harmful impact energy companies have on the environment, the general environmental venue question the Court declined to answer, the relevant civil
procedure statutes the Court did address, and the relevant prece40. Id. at *11-17 (noting appellate court decision was similar to other circuit
decisions).
41. Id. at *17-20 (explaining Fourth Circuit was incorrect to limit scope of
appellate review).
42. Id. at *20-23 (stating recurring conflict presented ideal case for Supreme
Court review).
43. BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 141 S. Ct. 1532, 1537 (granting certiorari
to review whether § 1447(d) provides appellate review over remand order’s entirety). In October 2021, the Supreme Court decided to hear West Virginia v. EPA,
another climate case dealing with the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA)
discretion regarding greenhouse gas regulation. See Lexi Smith, Supreme Court to
Weigh EPA Authority to Regulate Greenhouse Pollutants, YALE CLIMATE CONNECTIONS
(Nov. 7, 2021), https://yaleclimateconnections.org/2021/11/supreme-court-toweigh-epa-authority-to-regulate-greenhouse-pollutants/ (acknowledging upcoming
Supreme Court case and summarizing Court precedent relating to EPA’s role in
regulating climate change).
44. See Daniel Farber, The Climate Change Lawsuits Against Big Oil, Explained,
THE APPEAL (Jan. 29, 2021), https://theappeal.org/the-lab/explainers/the-climate-change-lawsuits-against-big-oil-explained/ (explaining climate change lawsuits and state and local governments’ reasons for suing energy companies).
45. See State Suits Against Oil Companies, STATE ENERGY & ENV’T IMPACT CTR.:
NYU SCH. OF L., https://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/state-impact/issues/climate-action/suits-against-oil-companies (last visited Dec. 26, 2021) (recounting various climate change lawsuits in which energy companies sought removal to different
courts).
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dent the Court cited in its reasoning are helpful to contextualize BP
P.L.C.46
A. Energy Companies’ Impact on Climate Change
Energy companies negatively affect the environment in various
ways.47 For instance, they emit large amounts of greenhouse gases
and other pollutants into the air and water through their everyday
operations.48 These operations also generate potentially dangerous
waste that harms the environment and causes problems future generations will have to confront.49
Regulatory bodies and energy companies themselves have tried
to limit these negative impacts.50 For example, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) has regularly issued regulations designed
to decrease energy companies’ greenhouse gas emissions.51 Additionally, the EPA and other regulatory bodies have encouraged energy companies to consider less harmful alternatives, primarily
focusing on renewable energy.52 Energy companies have implemented some changes to comply with regulatory requirements, but
still contribute a significant portion of total greenhouse gas
emissions.53

46. For a discussion of the relevant issues and background relating to BP
P.L.C., see infra notes 47-116 and accompanying text.
47. See About the U.S. Electricity System and Its Impact on the Environment, U.S.
ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/energy/about-us-electricity-system-andits-impact-environment (July 14, 2021) (providing overview of ways energy companies harm environment and contribute to climate change).
48. Id. (detailing how fuel burning contributes to increasing greenhouse gas
emissions and pollutants).
49. Id. (describing types of waste and impact on physical environment).
50. Id. (summarizing ways to mitigate further harm).
51. See Regulations for Emissions from Vehicles and Engines, U.S. ENV’T PROT.
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines (Aug.
26, 2021) (providing EPA’s various regulations relating to transportation, including guidance on greenhouse gas emissions).
52. See About the U.S. Electricity System and Its Impact on the Environment, supra
note 47 (focusing on how renewable energy can help decrease greenhouse gas
emissions).
53. See Peter Eavis & Clifford Krauss, What’s Really Behind Corporate Promises on
Climate Change?, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/22/business/energy-environment/corporations-climate-change.html (May 12, 2021) (detailing
how corporations contribute to rising greenhouse gas levels despite pledging to
decrease emissions).
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B. The Venue Question
United States environmental law varies by jurisdiction and operates through myriad sources.54 Congress has enacted key statutes,
such as the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act, and has authorized agencies like the EPA to regulate these laws.55 State and local
governments, however, have also implemented their own laws that
sometimes impose harsher penalties on polluters.56 Many environmentalists argue Congress has not enacted comprehensive federal
climate change legislation comparable to state and local
legislation.57
Over the last few years, politicians and regulators have pressed
energy companies to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.58 Part
of this pressure has come in the form of litigation, which puts energy companies at risk of liability for significant financial penalties.59 To decrease and delay liability, energy companies argue
cases should be litigated in federal court because climate change is
a global and national issue rather than a local issue.60 Further, energy companies point out the “effects of climate change” are national.61 Energy companies also generally disfavor state and local
courts because these venues potentially have more theories of liability compared to what federal law offers.62 For instance, the energy
54. Paul Tanaka, Michael Saretsty, Donna Ni, Maddy Foote & Matthew Swanson, Environmental Law and Practice in the United States: Overview, KIRKLAND & ELLIS
(May 21, 2021), https://www.kirkland.com/publications/article/2021/05/environmental-law-and-practice-in-the-united-state (outlining federal environmental
law).
55. Id. (providing examples of key federal environmental legislation); see, e.g.,
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (granting EPA power to regulate water pollutants); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (authorizing EPA to regulate emissions and air pollutants).
56. See Complaint, supra note 19, ¶ 11 (listing claims Baltimore alleged, including claims under Maryland Consumer Protection Act).
57. See Congress and Climate Change, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLS.,
https://www.c2es.org/content/congress-and-climate-change/ (last visited Oct. 12,
2021) (urging Congress to take action in absence of comprehensive climate
change legislation).
58. United Nations, supra note 1 (explaining increasing climate litigation
against energy companies worldwide).
59. See Hasemyer, supra note 5 (acknowledging dozens of climate cases across
country).
60. Id. (noting energy companies prefer federal court).
61. See, e.g., Brief of Atlantic Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioners, BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore, No. 19-1189, 2020 WL 6930644, at
*5-6 (U.S. Nov. 24, 2020) (arguing climate change is inherently federal because
emissions cross state lines and do not affect just one location).
62. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 19, ¶¶ 218-98 (explaining theories of liability available in Maryland).
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companies in BP P.L.C. may have been liable under Maryland’s specific private and public nuisance statutes as well as Maryland’s Consumer Protection Act; these claims, however, would not necessarily
be available in federal court.63
Conversely, state and local governments argue climate change
is not solely a federal issue because state-specific climate change
laws have existed and provided remedies for a relatively long time.64
States and localities contend energy companies must comply with
both federal and state law.65 Moreover, state and local governments note state courts often hear cases dealing with both federal
and state laws.66 These governmental bodies reject the argument
that climate change is solely a federal issue, acknowledging state
courts have historically heard these cases.67 Additionally, state and
local governments prefer litigation in state courts because these
courts allow states to both exercise broader police power and use
potential litigation awards more effectively.68 These damages essentially go directly to the local government, who can then use the
funds to repair and mitigate climate change destruction instead of
worrying about the federal government apportioning too little of
the potential award.69
The recent upswell in climate change litigation in federal appellate courts has particularly concerned environmentalists.70
Many environmentalists have questioned what this increase might
mean for climate change accountability.71 Notably, the Supreme
Court has been reluctant to make any sweeping determination regarding the proper venue for climate change litigation, presumably
63. See id. (outlining each state-specific cause of action).
64. See, e.g., Brief of the States of Maryland, California, Connecticut, New
Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee, BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore, No. 19-1644,
2019 WL 4200203, at *16-17 (4th Cir. Sept. 3, 2019) (arguing City’s claims do not
“arise under federal common law” and that “consequences of climate change often
are felt locally”).
65. See id. at *7-8 (providing examples in which federal law did not preempt
state laws).
66. See id. at *7-9 (asserting state courts often hear cases even if federal law is
on point).
67. See id. at *7-8 (rejecting counter arguments).
68. See id. at *18-20 (explaining why states favor litigation in state court).
69. See Hasemyer, supra note 5 (noting how localities utilize monetary rewards
from climate litigation).
70. See Grandoni, supra note 2 (observing environmentalists’ growing activism
in response to increasing litigation).
71. Id. (discussing rising litigation’s impact on climate change
accountability).
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due in part to the issue’s highly political nature.72 The Court has
only addressed more minor issues within the larger venue question,
specifically in cases like Massachusetts v. EPA73 and American Electric
Power Co. v. Connecticut.74
In Massachusetts, the Court analyzed whether the Clean Air Act
authorized the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, ultimately holding this was within the EPA’s power.75 Similarly, in
American Electric Power Co., the Court held the Clean Air Act preempted application of federal common law.76 Because the Court
ruled that federal law controlled the public nuisance claims in
these cases, energy companies and their lobbyists frequently cite
these decisions when arguing that climate change litigation belongs
exclusively in federal court.77
C. The § 1442 And § 1447(d) Questions
Civil procedure rules often have a much more significant impact on litigation than a case’s central theory.78 Federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction, meaning they can only hear certain
types of cases.79 Conversely, state courts generally have broader jurisdiction; federal courts often presume a case belongs in state
72. See Shawn M. LaTourette, Global Climate Change: A Political Question?, 40
RUTGERS L.J. 219, 284 (2008) (noticing Court’s failure to address climate change
suits and suggesting climate change does not necessarily invoke political question
doctrine).
73. 549 U.S. 497, 498-501 (2007) (holding states may sue EPA for failing to
regulate greenhouse gases).
74. 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011) (ruling states and cities cannot sue corporations
for greenhouse gas emissions under federal common law). More specifically, the
Court ruled the EPA has the primary authority to regulate emissions under the
Clean Air Act. Id. (ruling EPA’s authority to regulate under Clean Air Act displaces federal common law).
75. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528-32 (2007) (scrutinizing EPA’s authority under Clean Air Act).
76. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011) (holding
statute “displace[s] any federal common-law right[s]”).
77. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Energy Policy Advocates in Support of the Petitioners, BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore, No. 19-1189, 2020 WL 7049220, at *5
(U.S. Nov. 23, 2020) (arguing Supreme Court precedent clearly supports federal
preemption of state climate law).
78. See E. Farish Percy, It’s Time for Congress to Snap to It and Amend 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(1)(B)(2) to Prohibit Snap Removals That Circumvent the Forum Defendant Rule,
73 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 579, 580 (2021) (stating general belief that litigation location substantially affects civil torts cases).
79. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2 (authorizing federal courts to hear “cases and
controversies” as defined by Constitution). See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1631
(providing statutory authority for federal courts to hear particular kinds of cases).
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court if it is unclear whether the case should be in one venue or the
other.80
The statute the Court analyzed in BP P.L.C., § 1447(d), is a
removal statute that specifically contemplates one of the statutory
grounds for removing a case to federal court: 28 U.S.C. § 1442.81
Section 1442 permits federal officers to remove a case to federal
court.82 To successfully invoke the statute, the defendant must
show three elements: (1) that it is “‘acting under’ a federal officer,”
(2) that it has a “colorable federal defense,” and (3) “that the
charged conduct was carried out for o[r] in relation to the asserted
official authority.”83
A related civil procedure issue turns on § 1447(d)’s language.84 Section 1447(d) grants appellate courts the power to review orders remanding a case to state court when a defendant
removes the case “pursuant to section 1442 or 1443 of [Title 28].”85
Originally, § 1447(d) only contemplated § 1443.86 In 2011, however, Congress amended § 1447(d) by adding § 1442 as a basis for
removal; in fact, a House Report expresses Congress’s intention was
to give federal officers, such as politicians, the ability to move cases
from state to federal court to avoid local bias or prejudice.87
80. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1631 (inferring states are generally able to hear
cases federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear).
81. See BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 141 S. Ct. 1532, 1536 (2021) (outlining issues before Court); 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (granting appellate courts power to
review certain remand orders). In addition to § 1442, § 1447(d) also allows defendants to remove a case to federal court when a defendant invokes § 1443. Id.
(permitting removal for either § 1442 or § 1443).
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (providing avenue for removal for certain defendants).
83. Sawyer v. Foster Wheeler LLC, 860 F.3d 249, 254-55 (4th Cir. 2017) (listing requirements for manufacturer in case to be considered federal officer under
statute). The court noted the statute’s goal was “to protect the Federal Government from . . . interference with its ‘operations.’ ” Id. at 254 (quoting Watson v.
Philip Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142, 150 (2007)) (providing background on § 1442).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (outlining procedure for appellate review when case
is removed pursuant to specific removal statutes, including § 1442).
85. Id. (allowing appellate review in specific circumstances). Although appellate courts generally do not have the power to review such an order, there are
instances such as this in which review is statutorily permitted. Id. (examining appellate review when defendants invoke § 1442).
86. Act effective Sept. 30, 1996, Pub. L. No. 102-198, § 10(b), 105 Stat. 1626
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)) (outlining technical corrections to
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 and other provisions); 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (considering only civil rights statute § 1443).
87. H.R. REP. NO. 112-17, pt. 1, at 3 (2011) (expressing Congress’s desire to
remove suits to federal court when local prejudice is at issue). In the House Report, Congress posed a hypothetical lawsuit involving a House Representative to
illustrate the need for the statutory amendment and notably did not consider government contractors or other kinds of federal officers. Id. at 3-4 (providing specific example in report).
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A circuit split arose concerning whether § 1447(d) permits
broad appellate review over the entirety of a federal district court’s
remand order back to state court or narrow appellate review of only
those portions concerning § 1442 or § 1443.88 Seven circuits interpreted § 1447(d) to permit a narrow review that only considers the
parts of an order dealing with § 1442 or § 1443, whereas three circuits interpreted the statute to allow a broad review of the entire
remand order.89 The Fourth Circuit’s decision added uncertainty
to the circuit split on the issue of how broadly courts should interpret § 1447(d).90 Courts in favor of a narrow review held § 1447(d)
only authorized appellate review over § 1442 or § 1443 issues and
not every issue in the remand order because the statute explicitly
mentioned those bases.91 Contrarily, courts favoring a broader review concluded § 1447(d) authorized appellate review over every
issue based on § 1447(d)’s plain meaning and similar Supreme
Court precedent.92 This circuit split confused both the state and
local governments filing climate change lawsuits and the defendant
energy companies.93 As a result, energy companies asked the Supreme Court to resolve the circuit split.94 Subsequently, the Su-

88. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 979 F.3d 50, 53 (1st Cir.
2020) (holding appellate court only had authority to review federal officer and
civil rights parts of remand order); Cnty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 960 F.3d
586, 598 (9th Cir. 2020) (favoring review of only federal officer and civil rights
portions of remand order); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc.,
965 F.3d 792, 806-07 (10th Cir. 2020) (rejecting argument that § 1447(d) allows
broad review of entire remand order); Lu Junhong v. Boeing Co., 792 F.3d 805,
811 (7th Cir. 2015) (splitting from other appellate courts with respect to interpretation of § 1447(d)).
89. See, e.g., Rhode Island, 979 F.3d at 53 (affirming district court’s decision);
Cnty. of San Mateo, 960 F.3d at 598 (requiring only narrow review); Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs, 965 F.3d at 806-07 (rejecting defendants’ argument that § 1447(d) permits broad review over all parts of remand order); Lu Junhong, 792 F.3d at 811
(favoring broad review of entire remand order).
90. See, e.g., BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 952 F.3d 452, 460-61 (4th Cir.
2020) (limiting appellate review to specific issues in remand order).
91. See, e.g., Rhode Island, 979 F.3d at 53 (holding court did not have jurisdiction over any other claims); Cnty. of San Mateo, 960 F.3d at 598 (favoring limited
appellate review); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 965 F.3d at 819 (interpreting § 1447(d) as
only authorizing review over federal officer or civil rights removal claims).
92. See, e.g., Lu Junhong, 792 F.3d at 811 (holding § 1447(d) grants broad appellate review over remand orders).
93. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 38 (comparing Fourth Circuit’s decision to similar suits).
94. Id. (petitioning Supreme Court to review Fourth Circuit’s decision in light
of other analogous pending suits).
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preme Court decided to grant certiorari to provide clarity on the
scope of appellate review § 1447(d) provides.95
D. Supreme Court Precedent
In BP P.L.C., the Supreme Court exclusively reviewed
§ 1447(d)’s second clause for the first time.96 This meant that precedent interpreting § 1447(d)’s phrase “an order remanding a
case” was virtually nonexistent.97 As such, the Court relied on precedent contemplating similar appellate review issues and procedural statutes to decide this case.98 Baltimore, the energy companies,
and the Supreme Court primarily focused their arguments and reasoning on comparing this case to Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v.
Calhoun.99
First, Yamaha proved to be a significant case in analyzing the
meaning of § 1447(d)’s ordinary language because it dealt with a
similar civil procedure statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).100 One of the
issues in Yamaha was whether § 1292(b) provides appellate jurisdiction over a district court’s particular question or over the entirety of
a district court’s order.101 Section 1292(b) involves a similar issue
to § 1447(d) regarding the scope of appellate review.102 The Court
95. BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 141 S. Ct. 1532, 1537 (granting certiorari
to review whether § 1447(d) provides appellate review over remand order’s
entirety).
96. For a discussion of other precedent the Supreme Court reviewed relating
to § 1447(d)’s other parts, see infra notes 132-47 and accompanying text.
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (describing which remand orders are and are not
reviewable on appeal). For a discussion of relevant Supreme Court precedent, see
infra notes 99-116 and accompanying text.
98. See generally Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 204-05
(1996) (interpreting similar procedural statute grants appellate review over all
questions in order); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590, 635-36 (1874)
(holding federal court had duty to review entire case); United States v. Keitel, 211
U.S. 370, 398-99 (1908) (understanding statute to only make certain decisions appealable); Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 638 (2009) (addressing § 1447(d)’s first clause and holding it only applies to certain remand orders);
Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 345-46 (1976) (holding
district courts may not decline to hear cases defendants properly removed to federal court).
99. Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 204-05 (holding § 1292(b) provides broad appellate
review over any question and not just controlling question). In particular, the
Court reasoned that the word “involves” illustrates when an appellate court may
review a district court order and, therefore, did not limit appellate review only to
the controlling question of law. Id. (providing relatively short opinion on
§ 1292(b)’s correct interpretation).
100. See id. (analyzing § 1292(b)’s scope of appellate review).
101. Id. (outlining § 1292(b) issue).
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (granting appellate courts authority to exercise interlocutory jurisdiction over issues within remand order).
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in Yamaha focused solely on § 1292(b)’s text, noting the statute
states “[t]he Court of Appeals . . . may thereupon, in its discretion,
permit an appeal to be taken from such order . . . .”103 This language
signifies appellate courts have jurisdiction over the entire order and
not the particular question.104 Although the Court decided the
§ 1292(b) question in Yamaha without difficulty, the Court in that
case notably did not make a broad declaration that all procedural
statutes authorizing appellate review over district court rulings, like
§ 1447(d), automatically grant appellate jurisdiction over every issue within the ruling.105
Additionally, other Supreme Court precedent addressing appellate jurisdiction includes cases in which the Court held for a narrow scope of review.106 Precedent favorable to Baltimore includes
cases such as Murdock v. City of Memphis107 and United States v. Keitel.108 In Murdock, the Court limited its scope of appellate jurisdiction by declining to rule on the state law portions of the state
court’s decision; instead, the Court only reviewed the federal law
issues the state court contemplated.109 Keitel involved a similar limitation of appellate review.110 In that case, the Court held only certain decisions included in the Criminal Appeals Act were reviewable
on appeal.111 Other cases involving statutory concerns about
§ 1447(d) include Carlsbad Technology, Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc.112 and
Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermandsdorfer.113 Those cases examined
§ 1447(d)’s first clause regarding its relationship to a lack of sub103. Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 205 (citing § 1292(b)’s language).
104. Id. at 204 (reasoning that word “involves” before phrase “controlling
question” serves to describe when appellate review is appropriate and not scope of
review itself).
105. See id. (limiting analysis specifically to § 1292(b) and not contemplating
other procedural statutes).
106. For a discussion of other relevant precedent, see infra notes 107-16 and
accompanying text.
107. 87 U.S. 590, 591 (1875) (holding Judiciary Act of 1867 does not provide
jurisdiction over state claims).
108. 211 U.S. 370, 397-99 (1908) (ruling Criminal Appeals Act’s language
only allows government to appeal questions that statute contemplates).
109. Murdock, 87 U.S. at 630-32 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1257 to authorize
Supreme Court review of only federal issues within state court decisions).
110. See, e.g., Keitel, 211 U.S. at 398-99 (restricting appealable grounds to those
listed in statute).
111. See id. (concluding only certain challenges explicitly included in statute
were reviewable).
112. 556 U.S. 635, 637-38 (2009) (determining § 1447(c) and § 1447(d) did
not bar district court’s remand order because it was not remand order for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction).
113. 423 U.S. 336, 345-46 (1976) (holding federal district courts may not remand case solely for efficiency reasons).
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ject-matter jurisdiction or a removal defect.114 In Carlsbad, the
Court held that a district court’s remand order made after declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction did not mean the district
court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction for § 1447(c) or § 1447(d)
purposes.115 Further, in Thermtron, the Court held § 1447(d) allows
appellate review of a court’s remand order on grounds § 1447(c)
does not articulate.116
IV. READY TO KNOW WHAT THE SUPREME COURT KNOWS: A
NARRATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S OPINION
The Supreme Court decided to hear BP P.L.C. in 2020, ruling
solely on the following issue: whether § 1447(d) provides federal
appellate courts the power to review any issue in a remand order
when a defendant premises removal in part on either § 1442 (the
federal officer removal statute) or § 1443 (the civil rights removal
statute).117 Notably, the Court declined to rule on the merits of the
environmental claims and instead focused only on the civil procedure question.118 The Court did not, however, offer a particular
reason as to why it declined to rule on either the environmental or
§ 1442 questions.119 Moreover, Justice Alito did not participate in
the decision, presumably because his ownership of oil company
stocks presented a conflict of interest.120
114. Carlsbad, 556 U.S. at 638-39 (reviewing subject-matter jurisdiction’s relationship to remand orders); Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 346-52 (analyzing § 1447(d)’s
first clause).
115. Carlsbad, 556 U.S. at 636 (reversing appellate court’s decision and remanding to lower court).
116. Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 348-52 (basing holding on lack of evidence in statutory language or congressional history).
117. BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 141 S. Ct. 1532, 1537 (2021) (granting
certiorari in October 2020).
118. Id. at 1536 (stating case’s issue “is one of civil procedure”).
119. Id. (limiting review to § 1447(d) question).
120. Id. at 1543 (noting Justice Alito’s lack of participation). See generally John
Schwartz, Supreme Court Gives Big Oil a Win in Climate Fight with Cities, N.Y. TIMES
(May 17, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/17/climate/supreme-courtbaltimore-fossil-fuels.html (observing Justice Alito’s ownership of some defendants’ stocks). Other critics have argued that Justice Barrett should also have recused herself because of her father’s business affiliation with Shell. See id.
(describing Justice Barrett’s connection to oil industry); Bill McKibben, Amy Coney
Barrett Should Recuse Herself from Big Oil’s Supreme Court Case, NEW YORKER (Jan. 13,
2021), https://www.newyorker.com/news/annals-of-a-warming-planet/amy-coneybarrett-should-recuse-herself-from-big-oils-supreme-court-case (noting Justice Barrett’s father served as attorney for Shell for almost thirty years). Notably, in September 2021, a Wall Street Journal investigation found over 130 federal judges
violated ethical and legal rules requiring their recusal due to conflicts of interest.
James V. Grimaldi, Coulter Jones & Joe Palazzolo, 131 Federal Judges Broke the Law by
Hearing Cases Where They Had a Financial Interest, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2021, 9:07
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A. Majority Opinion
The Court disagreed with the Fourth Circuit and held there
was jurisdiction to consider all of the defendants’ grounds for removal.121 The primary focus of the Court’s analysis concerned the
plain meaning of § 1447(d)’s language.122 The Court then supplemented the analysis by examining comparable precedent and
briefly considering Baltimore’s policy arguments.123
In commencing its analysis, the Court first reviewed the text of
§ 1447(d).124 Examining the statutory language, the Court determined it necessary to consider the meaning of the term “ordinarily.”125 Section 1447(d) in its entirety reads:
An order remanding a case to the State court from which
it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise,
except that an order remanding a case to the State court
from which it was removed pursuant to section 1442 or
1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or
otherwise.126
In dissecting the relevant text from § 1447(d), the Court focused on the word “order” and acknowledged the lack of a qualifier
before the term.127 The Court compared § 1447(d) to
§ 1446(b)(2)(A), a statutory provision outlining procedural instructions for civil actions removed “solely under” § 1441(a).128 Section
1446(b)(2)(A) provides the following requirements for removal:
“When a civil action is removed solely under section 1441(a), all
defendants who have been properly joined and served must join in
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/131-federal-judges-broke-the-law-by-hearingcases-where-they-had-a-financial-interest-11632834421 (detailing 685 lawsuits from
2010 to 2018 in which federal judges failed to recuse themselves due to financial
interests).
121. BP P.L.C., 141 S. Ct. at 1543 (rejecting Fourth Circuit’s holding).
122. Id. at 1537-38 (reviewing § 1447(d)’s ordinary meaning).
123. Id. at 1539, 1541-43 (noting most analogous precedent of Yamaha and
rejecting Baltimore’s policy arguments).
124. Id. at 1537 (interpreting § 1447(d)’s language as it appears in codified
statute).
125. Id. (citing Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1479-80 (2021)) (applying textualist approach to interpret statute).
126. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (providing appellate review over certain remand
orders).
127. BP P.L.C., 141 S. Ct. at 1537 (explaining meaning of “order” at present
time is same as meaning when Congress adopted and amended statute). The
Court specifically stated no word qualifies “order” to the effect of changing the
term’s interpretation. Id. (examining statute grammatically).
128. Id. at 1538 (noting § 1447(d)’s lack of limiting language compared to
§ 1446(b)(2)(A)).
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or consent to the removal of the action.”129 According to the
Court’s interpretation, § 1447(d) is unlike § 1446(b)(2)(A) because the latter includes the qualifier “solely,” which more clearly
limits appellate review of an order.130 The Court explicitly rejected
Baltimore’s argument that the Court should interpret only part of a
remand order, ruling instead that any statutory exemption must be
given a “fair reading.”131
Next, the Court compared the case at issue to its most similar
precedent, Yamaha, to determine how best to read § 1447(d) in
light of any potential ambiguity.132 In its brief, Baltimore attempted to distinguish the case from Yamaha by noting the statute
at issue in Yamaha includes the word “involves,” which does not appear in § 1447(d).133 The Court, however, rejected that distinction,
holding the dispute in Yamaha did not center on the word “involves,” but rather on the word “order.”134 The Court explained
that BP P.L.C. is similar to Yamaha because it construed the same
word, “order.”135 Although § 1292(b) includes the word “involves,”
the Court determined this was irrelevant to the current case because the Court in Yamaha neither interpreted that word’s meaning
nor considered it in light of the word “order.”136
The Court also looked to other cases that Baltimore alleged
support a narrow reading of § 1447(d).137 The Court declined to
compare BP P.L.C to either Murdock or Keitel.138 Specifically, the
Court determined those cases were irrelevant because they contemplated dissimilar statutory contexts.139 According to the Court’s
129. 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(2)(A) (outlining requirements for removal of civil
actions).
130. BP P.L.C., 141 S. Ct. at 1538 (stressing Court was not persuaded of qualifying phrase’s impact).
131. Id. at 1538 (quoting Food Mktg. Inst. V. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct.
2356, 2366 (2019)) (rejecting defendants’ position).
132. Id. at 1539 (explaining Yamaha opinion resolved § 1447(d) dispute).
133. Id. at 1540 (noting Baltimore’s attempt to distinguish Yamaha from present case).
134. Id. (comparing statutory language Court focused on in Yamaha to present case).
135. BP P.L.C., 141 S. Ct. at 1540 (rejecting Baltimore’s reasoning based on
word “involves”).
136. Id. (reading Yamaha as only interpreting term “order”).
137. Id. (reviewing supporting cases Baltimore urged Court to consider);
Brief for Respondent Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of
Baltimore, No. 19-1189, 2020 WL 7634393, at *4-5 (U.S. Dec. 16, 2020) (emphasizing precedent supporting narrow reading of § 1447(d)).
138. BP P.L.C., 141 S. Ct. at 1540-41 (rejecting Baltimore’s claim that Murdock
and Keitel supported narrow review).
139. Id. (holding neither Murdock nor Keitel strengthened Baltimore’s arguments due to differences in circumstances).
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reasoning, those cases did not offer assistance in interpreting
§ 1447(d) and also allowed, rather than prohibited, appellate
courts to review those remand orders.140 The Court also declined
to apply the holdings in Carlsbad and Thermtron, which concerned
the provision in § 1447(d) barring appellate review of remand orders.141 Both cases held this provision only applies to remand orders dealing with issues relating to subject-matter jurisdiction or
defects in the order.142 The Court, however, stated that in those
cases, the Court allowed appellate courts to review such orders.143
Baltimore also cited a variety of lower court decisions that all
held for a narrow review.144 In doing so, Baltimore further argued
Congress impliedly authorized a narrow reading when it amended
the statute in 2011 by adding § 1442 as a basis for appellate review.145 The Court thought it unlikely that Congress implicitly authorized the lower court decisions with the 2011 amendments,
reasoning that the statute’s plain meaning is contrary to this sort of
inference.146 In particular, the Court was skeptical that Congress
paid sufficient attention to district court and circuit court opinions
to have authorized this interpretation when it amended the statute
in 2011.147 The Court also rejected Baltimore’s position that a
broad interpretation could mean defendants might not be required
to pay all or a portion of the plaintiff’s costs and fees.148 In rejecting this argument, the Court reasoned that appellate courts
often have independent review power over issues related to costs
and fees regardless of the scope of review a statute like § 1447(d)
provides.149
140. Id. at 1541 (distinguishing cases from current case).
141. Id. (considering cases dealing with § 1447(d)’s first clause generally barring appellate courts from reviewing remand orders).
142. Id. (noting case holdings did not rule for broader scope of review).
143. BP P.L.C., 141 S. Ct. at 1541 (explaining Carlsbad and Thermtron “permitted” instead of “foreclosed” appellate jurisdiction).
144. Id. (indicating Baltimore tried directing Court to lower court consensus
when Congress amended § 1447(d) in 2011).
145. Id. (explaining Baltimore’s argument regarding Congress’s implied approval of narrow review at time of amendment).
146. Id. (recognizing lower court consensus as “a smattering of . . . opinions”
Congress could not possibly endorse).
147. Id. (rejecting as unpersuasive Baltimore’s argument that Congress knew
about lower court opinions and subsequently endorsed consensus’s
interpretation).
148. See BP P.L.C., 141 S. Ct. at 1541-42 (explaining Baltimore’s concern regarding § 1447(c) requiring defendants to pay portion of plaintiff’s costs and fees
when federal district court remands case to state court).
149. Id. at 1542 (stating costs and fees are “independently appealable” and
refusing to address uncertified question).
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Lastly, the Court considered Baltimore’s policy argument that
a broad review would delay litigation.150 The Court took issue with
Baltimore’s assertion that a narrow review would expedite litigation, countering that a broad review might allow appellate courts to
resolve cases swiftly because the § 1442 or § 1443 issue might sometimes be difficult to decide.151 The Court also reasoned that both
§ 1447 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would protect
against potentially frivolous claims.152 Specifically, § 1447(c) gives
district courts power to make defendants pay certain expenses to
plaintiffs if they make a frivolous removal motion, whereas Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prohibits lawyers from making frivolous arguments.153 Ultimately, the Court hesitated to consider policy consequences and limited the scope of its decision to
interpreting the statute’s meaning; in doing so, the Court avoided
overstepping its judicial role and intruding on Congress’s power to
enact laws.154
B. Dissent
Justice Sonia Sotomayor was the only dissenter in the case.155
In her opinion, Justice Sotomayor provided an explanation of removal and a historical summary of § 1447(d).156 She noted that
prior to 2011, when Congress included § 1442 in § 1447(d), all appellate courts hearing the § 1447(d) question only interpreted it to
extend appellate review over § 1443 arguments.157 According to
Justice Sotomayor, a broad interpretation of § 1447(d) would allow
150. Id. (citing Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U.S. 41, 55 n.4 (2012)) (noting “clear
statutory directive” supersedes all policy considerations).
151. Id. (questioning Baltimore’s proposition regarding litigation delays). If
a circuit court perceives either a § 1442 or § 1443 question to be difficult and
acknowledges other clearer grounds justify removal, the court can proceed efficiently by addressing the straightforward questions. Id. (illustrating hypothetical in
which broad appellate review might expedite cases).
152. Id. at 1542-43 (citing mechanisms available to punish defendants making
frivolous claims).
153. BP P.L.C., 141 S. Ct. at 1542-43 (stating Congress has dealt with concern
over litigation delays via Rule 11 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); FED. R. CIV.
P. 11(b), (c) (prohibiting frivolous arguments and granting sanctions when party
violates Rule 11(b)).
154. See BP P.L.C., 141 S. Ct. at 1542-43 (differentiating Congress’s lawmaking
role from judiciary’s interpretation role).
155. Id. at 1543-47 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (providing case’s sole dissent).
156. Id. at 1543 (explaining removal and remand procedures). Justice
Sotomayor noted Congress was worried about parties prolonging litigation with
jurisdictional disputes. Id. (citing precedent establishing Congress’s concern).
157. Id. at 1545 (noting eight circuits agreed on narrow interpretation of
§ 1447(d) before Congress included § 1442 in 2011).
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future defendants to assert either § 1442 or § 1443 as bases for removal, even when the statutes would most likely not apply.158
Justice Sotomayor conceded that § 1447(d) does not contain
clarifying language like other congressional statutes.159 She laid
out the following three interpretations of § 1447(d), in which the
statute might: 1) “permit[ ] appellate review of any asserted basis
for removal so long as the suit was removed in part pursuant to
§ 1442 or § 1443”; 2) not permit appellate review at all if the suit
was “removed pursuant to multiple grounds”; or 3) only permit appellate review over the § 1442 or § 1443 bases.160 Justice Sotomayor
dismissed both the first option, which the majority adopted, and
the second option.161 She explained the first option allows defendants seeking to get into federal court the opportunity to make a
§ 1442 or § 1443 argument even when a court would likely reject
it.162 In contrast, the second option would virtually eliminate any
appellate review, even when a defendant only asserts either § 1442
or § 1443 grounds for removal.163 This interpretation contradicts
the spirit of § 1447(d) by not allowing any appellate review
whatsoever.164
Accordingly, Justice Sotomayor embraced the third option in
agreeance with Baltimore’s position.165 She determined this interpretation best fit Congress’s “longstanding policy” of limiting jurisdictional disputes that parties invoke to avoid litigation on a case’s
merits.166 Justice Sotomayor also reasoned that Court precedent indicated courts should construe statutory exceptions — like that in
§ 1447(d) — narrowly.167 She disagreed with the majority that
Congress was unaware of the appellate court consensus prior to the
158. Id. at 1543 (reasoning that broad review power allows defendants to
make § 1442 or § 1443 removal arguments and “lets the exception swallow the
rule”).
159. BP P.L.C., 141 S. Ct. at 1544 (admitting § 1447 is unclear in situations in
which defendants assert multiple grounds for removal).
160. Id. at 1544-45 (outlining three possible interpretations of § 1447(d)).
161. Id. at 1544 (rejecting both majority’s interpretation and interpretation
rejecting all appellate review).
162. Id. (implying broad review power facilitates defendants getting into federal court).
163. Id. (stating extremely narrow review is “bizarre outcome”).
164. BP P.L.C., 141 S. Ct. at 1544 (viewing § 1447(d) as Congress’s “express”
approval of appellate review over § 1442 or § 1443 claims).
165. Id. at 1544-45 (arguing interpretation best accords with Congress’s policy
of narrowly construing statutory exceptions and removal procedures).
166. Id. at 1544 (quoting Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551
U.S. 224, 228 (2007)) (stating interpretation balances legislative intent with plain
meaning).
167. Id. (providing general language from existing precedent).
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2011 amendment.168 She also disagreed with the majority’s comparison of Yamaha to the current case, arguing the language in
§ 1292(b), the statute at issue in Yamaha, was clearer than
§ 1447(d)’s language.169 Justice Sotomayor expressed concern that
the majority’s opinion would encourage defendants to invoke
§ 1442 in attempting to remove local cases to federal court, even
when those defendants are trying to remove their cases pursuant to
a different statutory ground.170
V. ASKING MORE QUESTIONS, NOT GETTING SOME ANSWERS: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’S OPINION
One could argue the Supreme Court correctly interpreted
§ 1447(d)’s plain language meaning.171 As Justice Gorsuch noted,
the statute does not technically limit review to specific parts of a
remand order.172 Additionally, Justice Sotomayor even stated
§ 1447(d) is not as clear as other statutes.173 Certain portions of
the majority’s decision, however, are somewhat misleading and fail
to acknowledge fully the decision’s potential impact on litigation
involving individuals and entities that may not actually be federal
officers.174
First, the majority made compelling points in its careful reading of § 1447(d).175 For instance, comparing the language of
§ 1447(d) to § 1446(b)(2)(A) — the latter of which includes the
phrase “solely under” before the word “order” — bolstered the majority’s holding by providing an example in which Congress added
a qualifying word to limit when cases are removable.176 Similarly,
the majority persuasively distinguished both Carlsbad and Thermtron
168. Id. at 1545 (noting majority of appellate courts embraced narrow interpretation over approximately fifty years).
169. BP P.L.C., 141 S. Ct. at 1546 (distinguishing § 1292(b) from § 1447(d)).
170. Id. (observing defendants only relied on § 1441(a)).
171. For a discussion of the majority’s interpretation of § 1447(d), see supra
notes 124-54 and accompanying text.
172. For a discussion of the majority’s interpretation of § 1447(d)’s plain language meaning, see supra notes 124-31 and accompanying text.
173. For a discussion of the dissent’s concession regarding § 1447(d)’s lack of
clear language, see supra notes 159-64 and accompanying text.
174. For a discussion of the majority opinion’s weaknesses, see infra notes
178-89 and accompanying text.
175. For a discussion of the majority opinion’s reasoning supporting a broad
interpretation of § 1447(d), see supra notes 124-54 and accompanying text.
176. For a discussion of the majority’s comparison of § 1447(d) to
§ 1446(b)(2)(A), see supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
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by emphasizing that those cases involved different statutory
contexts.177
The majority, however, missed an opportunity to strengthen its
decision by refusing to address whether energy companies qualify
as federal officers under § 1442.178 The majority expressly ignored
the likely fact that the energy companies would not qualify as federal officers under § 1442 as Congress intended.179 It is unclear
why the Court did not certify this question when it took the case,
which could result in circuit courts encountering difficulty in the
future when making these distinctions.180 Further, the majority’s
opinion lacks any reference to legislative history indicating Congress’s intent behind the § 1447(d) amendment in 2011.181 According to a 2011 House report, Congress’s reason for amending
§ 1447(d) was to ensure state courts could not hear cases involving
politicians for acts or duties such officers perform.182 The majority’s argument would be more thorough had it accounted for this or
similar legislative history.183
Instead, the Court attempted to close a door on the § 1442
question by stating the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow
courts to sanction parties for making frivolous arguments.184 Although the Court expressly refused to answer the § 1442 question,
this statement necessarily raised the question of whether energy
companies that contract with the federal government fit the particular type of federal officer § 1442 aims to protect; though the companies were probably not federal officers pursuant to the statute,
the dissent correctly noted courts are unlikely to impose sanc177. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s rejection of Baltimore’s precedent-based arguments, see supra notes 132-47 and accompanying text.
178. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s refusal to rule on whether energy companies qualify as federal officers, see supra note 119 and accompanying
text.
179. See generally BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 952 F.3d 452, 461-71 (4th
Cir. 2020) (holding energy companies do not qualify as federal officers under
§ 1442).
180. See BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 141 S. Ct. 1532, 1542 (2021) (declining to offer extensive explanation on refusal to answer federal officer question).
181. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 112-17, pt. 1, at 3-4 (2011) (offering congressional intent behind amendment of § 1447(d)).
182. Id. (expressing desire for public officials to remove cases to federal court
to avoid local bias).
183. See generally Theo I. Ogune, Judges and Statutory Construction: Judicial Zombism or Contextual Activism?, 30 U. BALT. L.F. 4, 7 (2000) (explaining Supreme Court
divide regarding statutory construction approaches and advocating for courts to
employ comprehensive statutory approach).
184. For a discussion of the majority’s point regarding sanctions, see supra
notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
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tions.185 Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit viewed § 1442 as inappropriate and would have either dismissed or remanded the case back
to the state court anyway.186
The majority also seemingly underappreciated the issue the
Court addressed.187 Specifically, the majority opinion repeatedly
stated that § 1447(d)’s language is “clear” even though it proved to
be the exact opposite; indeed, federal appellate courts themselves
could not agree on one interpretation of the post-2011 version of
the statute.188 The majority’s opinion also failed to consider the
financial inequity between the energy companies and the government entities that members of the Court commented on at oral
arguments.189
Justice Sotomayor’s lone dissent, though somewhat speculative,
is bold and commendable for addressing the statute’s potential impact on future litigation.190 Justice Sotomayor also provided valuable insight by applying § 1447(d) prospectively and anticipating
future problems the Court will likely need to address.191 The dissent envisioned how the Court’s holding will affect future litigants
by reasonably perceiving the possibility that energy companies will
be able to get into federal court more easily.192 Ultimately, Justice
185. See BP P.L.C., 141 S. Ct. at 1546-47 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing
sanctions will not stop “gamesmanship”). Justice Sotomayor articulated the
trouble regarding federal officer claims is that while such claims may be weak, they
are not necessarily “meritless” to the point a court will issue sanctions. Id. at 1547
(stating threat of sanctions may not be effective).
186. BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 952 F.3d 452, 461-71 (4th Cir. 2020)
(ruling against companies’ classification as federal officers).
187. See Transcript of Oral Argument, BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore, No.
19-1189, 2021 WL 197342, at *37 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2021) (providing Justice Kavanaugh stated ruling was “close call”).
188. See BP P.L.C., 141 S. Ct. at 1532, 1537 (noting circuit split as to proper
interpretation of § 1447(d)). As Justice Sotomayor’s dissent recognized, all circuit
courts interpreting § 1447(d) before the 2011 inclusion of § 1442 held for a narrow review. Id. at 1545 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (disputing majority’s characterization of appellate consensus as “smattering of lower court opinions,” arguing a
“two-thirds” consensus was not “beneath Congress’ notice”).
189. See Transcript, supra note 187 (demonstrating Justice Kavanaugh’s understanding of potential for inequitable litigation at oral arguments, which was
lacking in majority’s analysis of § 1447(d)’s ambiguity).
190. For a discussion of Justice Sotomayor’s examination of BP P.L.C.’s potential impact, see supra note 170 and accompanying text.
191. BP P.L.C., 141 S. Ct. at 1546 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting premise
that appellate jurisdiction will not always “necessarily” mean appellate courts will
have jurisdiction over every issue within that order).
192. Id. (fearing majority’s decision helps defendants who probably do not
qualify as federal officers). Justice Sotomayor noted the defendant energy companies dropped their § 1442 argument and only asked the Supreme Court to decide
whether removal was proper under § 1441(a), the federal-question jurisdiction
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Sotomayor’s perspective, especially regarding her claim that sanctions against energy companies would not be sufficient, effectively
countered the majority’s opinion.193
VI. WHAT WE WOULD PAY TO SPEND LESS DAYS WARM ON
SAND: BP P.L.C.’S UNLIKELY BUDDING POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC IMPACT

THE

The Court’s decision on a simple civil procedure provision
seems brief and unimportant at first sight, but BP P.L.C.’s potential
impact on the future of climate change litigation and legislation is
more than meets the eye.194 The decision gives elected officials an
opportunity to rethink how environmental law intersects with other
legal areas, specifically civil procedure.195 Although BP P.L.C. has
the potential to serve as notable historical context if the Supreme
Court ever rules on the proper venue for climate change lawsuits,
the case currently operates in a way that renders imminent climate
change litigation confusing, lengthy, and unequal.196
For one, the Supreme Court’s decision makes climate change
litigation even more perplexing for all parties involved.197 Although energy companies benefit from BP P.L.C., the decision now
leaves them wondering what it means to argue frivolously that their
companies are federal officers within the meaning of § 1442.198 Additionally, state and local governments must now ponder how to
hold those energy companies accountable without wasting
resources.199
statute. Id. (stating appellate court did not have authority to review only
§ 1441(a)).
193. Id. at 1543-47 (disagreeing with majority’s reasoning and providing insight into potential future problems Congress arguably did not intend).
194. For a discussion of BP P.L.C.’s potential impact, see infra notes 197-224
and accompanying text.
195. For a discussion of BP P.L.C.’s impact on Congress’s power to enact both
climate change legislation and procedural legislation, see infra notes 212-17 and
accompanying text.
196. For a discussion of BP P.L.C.’s impact on climate change litigation itself,
see infra notes 197-204 and accompanying text.
197. For a discussion of how BP P.L.C. complicates climate change litigation
for various parties, see infra notes 198-204 and accompanying text.
198. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (prohibiting frivolous arguments); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) L. GOVERNING LAWS. § 110 cmt. b (2021) (elaborating on meaning of “frivolous advocacy”); Keith A. Call, Can We Define “Frivolous”?, 32 UTAH B.J. 48, 50
(2019) (illustrating difficulty of defining “frivolous”); see also Erin Schiller & Jeffrey
A. Wertkin, Note, Frivolous Filings and Vexatious Litigation, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
909, 910 (2001) (exploring statutes and rules enacted to provide clearer definition
of frivolous).
199. See Benjamin T. Sharp, Note, Stepping into the Breach: State Constitutions as
a Vehicle for Advancing Rights-Based Climate Litigation, 14 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
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Perhaps more significant, though, is that this decision also
leaves federal circuit courts confused about their role in deciding
climate change disputes.200 By declining to rule on BP P.L.C.’s environmental merits, the Supreme Court makes an already overcast
area of the law even hazier for appellate courts attempting to decide whether climate change issues belong in federal or state
court.201 The Court’s refusal to rule on the § 1442 question leaves
circuit courts wondering when an energy company does qualify as a
federal officer under § 1442.202 Similarly, though the Court seems
to imply that some federal officer arguments may be frivolous and
therefore sanctionable, the Court’s refusal to rule expressly on this
issue leaves appellate courts little guidance on how to reach this
determination and when to impose sanctions.203 More broadly, circuit courts are left in the dark regarding how to rule on the many
potential facets of a climate change lawsuit, creating the possibility
of a deeper circuit split on related procedural issues.204
The Court’s decision ultimately comes at the average citizen’s
expense.205 As Justice Sotomayor implied in her dissent, BP P.L.C.
perpetuates inequitable litigation by allowing energy companies to
POL’Y SIDEBAR 39, 44 (2019) (examining how state constitutions might help individuals succeed in climate change litigation); see also Reeva Dua, Note, Driving on
Empty: The Fate of Fossil Fuel Companies in Climate Nuisance Litigation, 4 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. ONLINE 115, 119 (2019) (examining how individuals and government
entities might use “Master Settlement Agreement[s]” instead of “court-determined
judgment[s] for monetary damages”).
200. For a discussion of BP P.L.C.’s impact on appellate courts’ decisions moving forward, see infra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
201. See BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 141 S. Ct. 1532, 1536 (2021) (refusing to address case’s environmental merits). See generally Noah Star, Case Comment, State Courts Decide State Torts: Judicial Federalism & the Costs of Climate Change, a
Comment on City of Oakland v. BP PLC (9th Cir. 2020), 45 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 195,
209-15 (2021) (arguing state courts should decide climate change tort suits instead
of federal courts). Generally, states base the argument that they should decide
climate change disputes on state courts’ history of shaping common law tort doctrine. Id. at 213 (warning federal courts of potential for imbalance between state
and federal governments if defendants successfully remove cases to federal court).
202. See generally Michael E. Klenov, Note, Preemption and Removal: Watson
Shuts the Federal Officer Backdoor to the Federal Courthouse, Conceals Familiar Motive, 86
WASH. U. L. REV. 1455, 1490-91 (2009) (stating Supreme Court precedent regarding federal officer removal statute is complicated and benefits corporations Congress did not seek to protect under federal officer removal statute).
203. See BP P.L.C., 141 S. Ct. at 1547 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (stating some
federal officer arguments may be weak, but do not necessarily warrant sanctions
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
204. See id. (expressing concern that defendants can “sidestep these restrictions by making near-frivolous arguments for removal under § 1442 or § 1443” and
implying courts may need to analyze meaning of “frivolous” argument).
205. For a discussion of the Court’s analysis and the concern that its decision
prolongs litigation, see supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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delay litigation.206 Energy companies are generally wealthier than
state and city governments, enjoying a combined total yearly revenue nearly double that of a city like Baltimore.207 Consequently,
these companies can typically expend more resources litigating a
jurisdictional dispute, even though those resources would arguably
be better spent elsewhere.208 Even if federal courts sanction energy
companies for making frivolous federal officer arguments, it is unclear how severe those sanctions would be and whether they would
have any significant effect on companies’ litigation strategies.209
This puts states and cities leading the climate change fight in a difficult position in which they must decide whether the potential monetary rewards justify spending substantial funds on lengthy
litigation.210 Essentially, this case increases the burden on local
governments to think of creative, long-term strategies to hold energy companies accountable for their contributions to climate
change.211
In a similar vein, BP P.L.C. pressures states and cities to make
an effective appeal to the people this case impacts the most: average
taxpaying citizens who are paying for both this litigation and the
damage climate change brings.212 This may prove to be a difficult
task, as some scholars have criticized the media for failing to con206. See BP P.L.C., 141 S. Ct. at 1547 (stating Baltimore waited three years to
litigate environmental claims).
207. Compare Clifford Krauss, Exxon Mobil and Chevron Report First Quarterly
Profits After Several Losses, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/30/business/exxon-mobil-chevron-profit.html (Oct. 29, 2021) (reporting energy companies’ first quarterly profits for 2021 reached approximately two billion dollars),
with BRANDON M. SCOTT, CITY OF BALT., MARYLAND, PRELIMINARY BUDGET PLAN: FIS2022 4 (2021), https://bbmr.baltimorecity.gov/sites/default/files/
CAL
fy22_prelim_FINAL_web.pdf (reflecting city’s preliminary budget of 3.6 billion
dollars for Fiscal Year 2022).
208. Compare Clifford Krauss, supra note 207 (demonstrating energy companies’ wealth), with BRANDON M. SCOTT, supra note 207 (illustrating limited resources in cities like Baltimore).
209. See generally BP P.L.C., 141 S. Ct. at 1546-47 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(concluding sanctions are not “failsafe” option, even if they generally deter lawyers
from making frivolous arguments); Transcript, supra note 187, at *35-36 (providing Justice Kagan also scrutinized whether argument was actually frivolous).
210. See Geetanjali Ganguly, Joana Setzer & Veerle Heyvaert, Article, If at First
You Don’t Succeed: Suing Corporations for Climate Change, 38 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
841, 842 (2018) (arguing current climate change lawsuits, in addition to evolving
understanding of climate change, will result in positive outcomes despite seeming
defeats).
211. See generally Grace Nosek, Article, Climate Change Litigation and Narrative:
How to Use Litigation to Tell Compelling Climate Stories, 42 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y REV. 733, 802-03 (2018) (outlining how plaintiffs can shift current litigation
paradigm to persuade public to support climate change action).
212. See generally Andrew Gage, Why Hold Fossil Fuel Companies Accountable for
Climate Costs?, W. COAST ENV’T L. (Jan. 11, 2019), https://wcel.org/blog/why-hold-
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textualize fully the ways in which climate change impacts average
citizens; considering BP P.L.C. did not receive as much media coverage as other Supreme Court cases from the 2020-2021 term, generating public support may prove especially onerous.213
Environmental activists, though, were quick to note that BP P.L.C.
was a significant victory for energy companies.214 Even if environmentalists’ subsequent appeals to enact harsher federal climate
change legislation are unsuccessful, public pressure for additional
federal legislation has substantially increased over the past few
years.215 This case puts more pressure on Congress to enact comparable federal climate change law as well as related laws to deter energy companies from striving to litigate in federal court.216 If
Congress strengthens federal climate change law, the Supreme
Court might finally address the broader venue question, which, depending on its resolution, might further impact state climate
change law by rendering it virtually obsolete.217
Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s refusal to rule on whether
state or federal court is the appropriate venue for climate change
litigation in BP P.L.C. signifies the Court’s general reluctance to

fossil-fuel-companies-accountable-climate-costs (claiming taxpayers bear brunt of
climate costs).
213. See Adam Liptak & Alicia Parlapiano, Tracking the Major Supreme Court
Decisions This Term, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/06/
01/us/major-supreme-court-cases-2021.html (July 1, 2021) (listing major Supreme
Court cases from 2020-2021 term); Frederick Hewett, Media Coverage of Climate
Change Is Improving. But That Alone Won’t Stamp Out Disinformation, WBUR (July 2,
2021), https://www.wbur.org/cognoscenti/2021/07/02/heat-political-bias-in-climate-coverage-frederick-hewett (encouraging media outlets to cover climate
change more frequently).
214. See Jason Mark, Supreme Court Delivers a Victory to Big Oil, SIERRA CLUB
(May 20, 2021), https://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/supreme-court-delivers-victorybig-oil (claiming BP P.L.C. decision benefits energy companies).
215. See generally Alex Samuels & Mackenzie Wilkes, Americans Want the Government to Act on Climate Change. What’s the Hold-Up?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 8, 2021,
6:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/americans-want-the-governmentto-act-on-climate-change-whats-the-hold-up/ (explaining pressure on Congress to
keep climate-related provisions in pending infrastructure bill).
216. See generally Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited
Government in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 423-24 (2011) (observing
complex relationships between government branches and effect on developing
richer law). Justice Sotomayor also noted Congress could amend § 1442 after the
Court’s decision in BP P.L.C. BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 141 S. Ct. 1532,
1547 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (observing Congress’s ability to clarify statutory language).
217. See generally Karen C. Sokol, Seeking (Some) Climate Justice in State Tort Law,
95 WASH. L. REV. 1383, 1438 (2020) (arguing possible federalization of state climate change law threatens future effectiveness).
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decide such a politically charged issue.218 The Court’s opinion in
BP P.L.C. sends a subtle “SOS” signal to Congress for assistance in
adjudicating these litigation battles, and this call for help will likely
only intensify as time progresses.219
The Supreme Court’s decision in BP P.L.C. — though just one
of “civil procedure” — presents an opportunity for Congress to
fight for the average taxpaying citizen, enact stricter federal climate
change law, and clarify the proper venue for climate change
claims.220 In turn, however, the future of climate change litigation
ultimately comes down to those same taxpayers.221 Challenging the
threat inequitable litigation presents for future climate change
cases will only occur when those constituents persuade Congress to
review all legal mechanisms, including the civil procedure statutes
that lead to decisions similar to this case.222 BP P.L.C. serves as a
reminder to Congress of its power and responsibility to enact and
revise civil procedure statutes that may not seem consequential to
its policy goals at the outset.223 Finally, this case encourages Congress to consider how its failure to create clear, stringent climate
change legislation and corresponding procedural laws costs taxpaying citizens much more than it realizes.224
Natalie Poirier*
218. For a discussion of the environmental venue question, see supra notes 5477 and accompanying text.
219. For a discussion of how BP P.L.C. necessarily implicates Congress, see
supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
220. For a discussion of BP P.L.C.’s potential impact on federal climate
change legislation, see supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
221. For a discussion of BP P.L.C.’s indirect impact on taxpayers, see supra
note 205-11 and accompanying text.
222. For a discussion of BP P.L.C.’s subsequent impact on taxpayers, see supra
notes 205-11 and accompanying text.
223. For a discussion of Congress’s power to enact civil procedure statutes,
see supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
224. For a discussion of BP P.L.C.’s impact on Congress as it relates to the
broader electorate, see supra notes 212-15 and accompanying text.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2023, Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law; M.S., Arts Administration, 2018, Drexel University; B.A., English, 2017,
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